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INTRODUCTION 
Regufation is a fascinating subject which affectB many areas of commercia{ activities and which often pfays a significant rofe in detennining how these activities are 
carrlad out and by whom. 
Regulation in Malta is evolving but it also appears to be under stress. New regulatory structures are being set up as old strucb..ires lind themselves questioned and 
re-<lrawn, often with ambiguous results and uncertain benefits. Some regulators are not as autonomous as some Imagine them to be or Indeed as the legislation 
itself would have envisaged them to be. Several politically appointed persons in leading regulatory positions are really occasional or accidental regulators rather 
than professional regulators. A few unlikely regulators still try too hard to please and to remain close to their political masters. This mindset inevitably distracts 
them from the higher mission of protecting the general interests of the community and the legitimate expectations of consumers. Governing boards are filled by 
political appointees, a method which does not guarantee competence or diligence. Several people occupy senior regulatory positions without enjoying adequate 
background or sufficient knowledge and competence. Like politicians, including ministers, they are not subjected to a lit and proper due diligence test, either upon 
their appointment or on an ongoing basis. A number of recent interesting developments in the local regulatory field are considered below. 
THE ACCOUNTANCY PROFESSION 
The newly designed framework for the Mure regulation of the accounting profession was recently in the news. This follows an EU directive on the subject which 
seeks to ensure greater independence and autonomy of the national regulatory agency from the actual operators. On 27 May 2016, Prof. Edward Scicluna, 
Minister for Finance, and former Chairman of the Malta Financial Services Authority, delivered an interesting speech to a joint gathering of members of the Malta 
Institute of Accountants and the Association of Chartared Certified Accountants where he raised significant regulatory issues such as regulatory capture and 
conflicting interests. The newly constituted Accountancy Board - the profession's regulatory board -was described by the minister as a first for Malta as it is now 
composed solely of non-practitioners. 
"Can you imllflina that happaning to the medical or legal pmfusions?" he aslrerl. 
Minister Sciduna also highlighted that the regulatory landscape had shifted in the past years and today, following various well-known mishaps, much higher 
standards were being expected from this profession. 
Minister Scicluna stated that the recent amendments to the Accountancy Profession Act strengthened the principles of free movement of personnel across EU 
member states and have increased competition, whereby small audit linms will have more opportunities to compete through a system of regulated rotation. Minister 
Scicluna also remarked that: 
"The h•nlest pending option for lllaltll wu the 181110vlllfl of the obligation by mlr:nHHJteqJrlaes to carry out the annual •udlt af small entetprlaes. So 
fill; the Govwnment is not convinced that it is in the interest of these enfetprises to remove th;. oblig•tion since both the blinks •nd the tu •ufhorities 
Nly on this Independent ...... ment In dealing with then entel'prlsea." 
THE ARBITER FOR FINANCIAL SERVICES 
The first arbiter for Financial Services has now been appointed following the entry into force of the Arbiter for Financial Services Act, 2016. This new office 
enhances the framework for the settlement of consumer complaints in the investments services, insurance and banking sectors. It introduces a new instrument for 
Malteee investors and depositors which almost exclusively deals with private law claims against licence-holders, typically claims for refunds and compensation for 
loss. The new law on the subject came into force a few weeks ago and it is still a work in progress as the necessary logistics are still being set up. At the time of 
writing, the Office of the Arbiter had just published a call for applications for various posts. Another advert, strangely in my view, insisted that complaints should be 
submitted In Maltase. 
It still too early to judge the performance of this special grievance mechanism which had (at the time of writing) only just started to deal with acb..ial complaints. An 
early hurdle that the arbiter may have to face refers to the lingering claims from the BOV Property Fund debacles and possible Issues with acquired rights and 
prescription. Adverts in the press over the past weeks have shown that BOV property fund claimants are being mobilised to submit their claims before the arbiter. 
The law allows the arbiter to hear cases which involve disputes and claims that may have arisen after 1 May 2004. Luckily, the appointee is a member of the legal 
profession with experience in handling these delicate issues and is able to make judicious resort to equity in the appropriate cases. 
The arbiter is appointed for seven years after which he would not be eligible for re-appointment. He can award compensation to aggrieved consumers up to EUR 
250,000 plus additional costs. The parties have a right to at last one sitting and cases are generally to be decided within ninety days. Both parties may appeal the 
arbiter's decisions. 
One now waits to see how this new consumer mechanism will operate in the coming months and years and whether it will prove as consumer-friendly as had been 
promised. It Is certainly a novel feature In the extensive and complex framework under which financial services shall henceforth be carT1ed out and regulated. 
ESTATE AGENTS 
A few months ago, a draft bill accompanied by a very meagre and unsatisfactory explanatory note (jointly badly described as a White Paper and a Property Code) 
was presented by the relevant minister (who has since been replaced) and by representatives from the building and estate agency sectors. Representatives of 
these two sectors of Industry had been raising expectaUons for weeks regarding the Impending publlcaUon, and were clearly sending a signal that they were 
directly involved in the process. This was very noticeable when the policy document was presented and discussed in public fora. What was also clearly noticeable 
was the complete absence of consumers and consumer agencies from the discussions and the consultations involving this recent White Paper. An unusual and 
unacceptable rule found in the new draft law is the possibility for those with known and declared conflicts of interest to be allowed to sit on the new regulatory 
agency being proposed for authorising and monitoring estate agents. This rule does not benefit consumers or even estate agents generally, but rather it seems to 
safeguard the position of particular persons involved in property transactions and who actively assisted and participated in drawing up the new policy and draft 
legislation. We have to wait and see how this White Paper and draft law will proceed and whether the draft law will be improved both stylistically and to ensure a 
more consumer-friendly regulatory mechanism. The full title of the document, published earlier this year, is 'White Paper: Malta's Property Code and Regulations 
2016'. 
Under UK law, the regulation of estate agents does not follow the traditional approach of creating a positive obligation to apply for a licence. Instead, under the 
Estate Agents AJ:J. 1979, anybody can act as an estate agent unless the relevant authority (The Director General of Fair Trading) decides that the person Is unfit to 
provide such services. Fraud or violence are typical reasons for rendering a parson unfit. So in brief, avery parson may act as an estate agent until when he is 
shown to be unfit as detennined by the Director General who may for this reason issue a prohibition order. This is not a model I would support but it is an 
interesting alternative as to how regulation can taka place. 
THE ECB, THE CBM AND THE MFSA 
Banking is a sector which clearly shows the impact that EU membership has had and is having on the way regulation happens. The way local banks and their 
senior offiCials are appointed and regulated has undergone various drastic changes during these past few years with the European Central Bank (ECB) now 
playing a direct supervisory role over Maltese banks and in particular those considered 'significanr. Previously, all local banks were authorised and supervised by 
the Malta Financial Services Authority from the cradle Ia the grave, and before it, by the Central Bank of Malta (CBM). This institution was established by the 
Central Bank of Malta Act of 1967. Today, certain important decisions relating to Maltese banks are taken by the ECB. The local banks deemed 'significanf are 
today supervised dinsctly by the ECB. This nspnssents a huge new development and the implications ans only now being understood. 
The role of the ECB was nscently part of a rather heated but intenssting debate concerning one of the deputy governors of the CBM who was poised to taka over 
the governorship following the end of the incumbent's tenn. The discussion focussed significantly on who appoints whom and how appointments may be 
tenninated. 
The CBM is run by a board of directors, which include a governor and two deputy governors. The governor and the two deputy governors are appointed by the 
President who has to act on the advice of the Prime Minister. The other directors ans appointed directly by the Prime Minister. This is a clear result of the Central 
Bank of Malta Act. Such senior appointments need to be made after cansful study and attention. Ideally candidates should undergo a full due diligence process, a 
requirement that does not arise under the Act. COntrary to what was claimed by various persons in important posts, the ECB dos not appoint the govemor or the 
deputy governors; and it has no legal power to approve, accept and nsject nominees or even to question their appointment as these ans matters nsserved and 
pertaining solely to the national authorities. Nor is there any justification for suggesting that the behaviour of the deputy governor was a matter for discussion and 
determination by the board of directors, of which he fonms part. The law does not give the board this power which cannot be burdened with the responsibility of 
judging or dismissing one of its own members. 
There was also some talk end references to the need to safeguard the 'autonomy' of the CBM In this context. This discussion was rather unsatisfactory and 
shallow. It is incorrect to suggest that the CBM is fully or unlimitedly autonomous. It is an institution whose perfonnance may be questioned by the courts and is 
subject to the provisions of the law which regulates its very existence, its functions and operations, as well as other legislation. The law is passed by Parliament on 
the direction of the government, and not by the CBM. The entire board of directors, including the govemor, is appointed by a purely political decision and no 
internal mechanism exists within the CBM which would allow these appointments to be executed and detannined intemally without outside political intervention. 
The same applies to other entities such as the Malta Financial Services Authority where the board of governors, induding the chainnan, are all appointed by the 
Prima Minister (not the Minister for Finance) at his discn~tion. The Malia Financial Services Authority Act assigns to this politically appointed board the legal 
authority to appoint all the directors and deputy directors (and they are indeed many) of the agency. Both these entities and others remain subject to a number of 
oversight mechanisms, including the CBM Act and the general law of the land, the courts and other relevant administrative tribunals, whi&Ueblowing legislation, the 
Ombudsman, the Public Accounts COmmittee, and the National Audit Ollice. These may all in some way serve to question their behaviour and performance, and 
rightly so. They a-eate a system of checks and balances needed and justified in a democratic society so as to prevent or detect abuse, acts of maladministration 
and other wrongdoing. 
The laws which set up public corporations give specific attention and contain clear provisions as to how the senior posts are to be appointed, usually by politicians, 
a minister or the Prime Minister. However, insufficient attention is often given as to how they can be nsmoved and by whom. The nsmoval of heads and senior staff 
of public agencies is without doubt a highly sensitive subject fraught with controversy. Nevertheless, as was the case with the possibly needless controversy as to 
who at law could remove (or suspend) a deputy governor of the (CBM), it appears axiomatic that in the lack of a specific provision on removal, the persons or 
organs specifically empowered to appoint in the first place would also be considensd to have the added responsibility of exercising the power of dismissal or 
suspension. Naturally, the powers imply a heavy responsibility and should only be used sparingly where the proper circumstances legally subsist. 
A long over-due discussion has also been witnessed in the media on whether and how fer regulators should be pennitted to place themselves in confticts of 
interest and for how long heads of regulatory agencies should be allowed to stay in their post. A strong suggestion doing the rounds is that members appointed to 
the board of regulatory agencies should not serve for more than two tenns or for ten years as a maximum. President Obama will soon be leaving his post after 
serving the maximum two tenns. Prof. Juan Ito Camlller1, Rector of the University of Malta, has recently done the same. This rule would prevent certain people from 
becoming too accustomed to their proverbial 'poltrona' with related perks and privileges and would hopefully serve as a guarantee against apathy, possible abuse 
and a undue sense of one's indispensability. The nscent FIFA debacle with the abusive Mr Blatter expressing an indefinite and insatiable desire and determination 
to nsmain in his important and lucrative post has highlighted why definite durations should be imposed on positions of regulatory agencies and other public sector 
boards. 
CONCLUSION 
This article has brieny renected on a number of regulatory developments in Malta. II follows a talk I delivered last April on 'Issues in Local Regulation' to the second 
Banking and Finance Conference organised by the Faculty of Economics, Markating and Accountancy of the University of Malta. I ended my talk by listing ten 
inter-related observations from my various regulatory experiences which started in 1992. These were my ten propositions drawn from my long experiences in and 
with different regulatory agencies covering 24 years. They have not yet been published elsewhere and can hopefully provide a useful conclusion: 
• Regulation in Malta has not yat reached a slate of maturity and is still largely a work in prognsss. 
• Regulators in Malta need to become more professional and need to train themselves better to become true specialists in their craft. 
• Regulators can only legitimately set and require high standards from their licence-holders if they themselves adhere to even higher standards of ethical 
conduct and corporate governance, in deeds not just words. Regulators should accordingly lead by example. 
• RegiJatonl should raallae lhat pllbllc axpectatf0118 ara on !he riBa and !hey may expect graatar pllbllc aautlny and a!tfclsm In the future. They ana bourld to 
face higher demands for daclahte action, for ln!n&pareriClf and accountability and fDr alhlcal coherence. 
• RegiJatonl ara thana to nagulats; !hey are not sat up to sell, or to be papillar or to please politicians or waled in111r88t:a; ralhar than dasciile lhamselves as 
friarldly, approadlable and accommCX'Ia&tg, !hey~ to be morv8llllartive, effac:tive, n~liallle, compeCI'Int, sef\Sillle arid fair. 
• RegtJalonl ehould only do '~~flat !he law a11owe !hem to do arid they allould not take any libertiee wilh their atatutory powen and function e. 
• RegtJatons in Malta have so fv tailed to show coiH!Irence, leadersllip and determination in the implementation and enforcement of the rules of fair 
competition and of high levels of c:onsumer pn~tedion in lheir reapedive sec!CII'S. 
• ReglMtors In Mana d !lave muctl to do to comrNVtd and lrwplre p~lc conftclence. 
• ReglMtonl ehould make themeelves more aware of !he challengee of regulalxlry cap1l.re and other fomne of lnftuertce and !hey ehould ba particularly WatrY of 
undue tamlllarlty wllh !he economically powerful and the politically oonnel:led. And finally ... 
• RegiJatonl and Regulation In Malta, aa alsewhenl, ramalna a complex, c:hallanglng, faaclnatlng arid oftan controversial tlald of study. Whar8aa Regulators 
and Regulaticm ara on the 1~. local academic material on !he subfac:t haa fa! lad to c:atch up and namalfl8 ganan~lly lncomplats. In any avant, acadamlc 
itaratura neada to mave away from dllsc:rip!MI narrative and an gage mora in aitical analysia. 
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